The Battle of Franklin

The battle of Franklin occured on November 30, 1864 and was located in Tennesee. Franklin followed the Battle of Spring Hill of the previous day. Hood's Army of Tennessee had failed to destroy part of the Union force in Tennessee, allowing Schofield's Army of the Ohio to escape. Hood had hoped to destroy Schofield before he could link up with the Army of the Cumberland, commanded by Maj. Gen. George Henry Thomas, farther north in Nashville, Tennessee. That combined Union force would be over 60,000 men. When the armies met at Franklin, however, Hood had approximately 38,000 men to Schofield's 30,000.
Schofield's advance guard arrived in Franklin at about 6:00 a.m., after a forced march north from Spring Hill. Brig. Gen. Jacob Dolson Cox, a division commander temporarily commanding the Union XXIII Corps (and later governor of Ohio), immediately began preparing strong defensive positions around breastworks originally constructed for the First Battle of Franklin in 1863. The defensive line formed approximately a semicircle around the city, from northwest to southeast; the other half of the semicircle was the Harpeth River.
Schofield's decided to defend at Franklin with his back to the river because he had no pontoon bridges then available to cross; the bridges had been left behind in his retreat from Columbia because they lacked wagons to transport them. He needed time to repair one of the two permanent bridges spanning the river (both of which had been burned) and to lay planking over the undamaged railroad bridge to enable it to carry wagons and troops. His supply train parked in the side streets to keep the main pike open but continued to cross, first via a ford next to the burned out pike bridge, and later in the afternoon by the two makeshift bridges. By the beginning of the assault, nearly all the supply wagons were across the Harpeth and on the road to Nashville.
By noon the Union works, a strong exterior line fronted by a ditch and a secondary support line some 65 to 40 yards behind the center, were ready. Counter-clockwise from the northwest were the divisions of Maj. Gens. Nathan Kimball (IV Corps), Thomas H. Ruger (XXIII Corps), and Cox (XXIII Corps). Two brigades of Brig. Gen. George D. Wagner's division of IV Corps were a half mile forward, screening the Confederate approach, with orders to fall back if pressed. Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood's division of IV Corps was posted north of the Harpeth to watch for any flanking attempt. Schofield planned to withdraw his infantry across the river by 6:00 p.m. if Hood had not arrived by then.
Hood's army began to arrive on Winstead Hill, two miles south of Franklin, around 1 p.m. Hood was noted for his aggressive, sometimes reckless battlefield leadership, and had since his assumption of command of the Army of Tennessee stung it with criticisms that it was reluctant to fight except behind breastworks. Over the objections of his top generals, he ordered a frontal assault in the dwindling afternoon light against the Union forces, now strongly entrenched behind two lines of breastworks and with Wagner a half mile in front. Many believe that Hood was still angry that the Federal army had slipped past his troops the night before at Spring Hill, but angry or not, Hood's objective was to try to crush Schofield before he and his troops could escape to Nashville. The Confederates began moving forward at 3:30 p.m. to 4 p.m., with Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham's corps on the left of the assault and Lt. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart's on the right. Hood's attack initially enveloped Wagner's forward brigades under Lane and Conrad, which despite orders not to engage in front of the works, stood their ground. Whether or not Wagner ordered the change in orders from those issued by XXIII Corps commander Gen. Cox remains a matter of controversy (Wagner claimed he did not; one brigade commander contradicted him in official reports and Wagner was relieved of command in December.) The veteran soldiers of these brigades fled back to the main breastworks while untried replacements were reluctant to move under fire and were captured.
Officers in Strickland's brigade (Ruger's division, west of the turnpike) failed to prepare for passage of the lines by the retreating troops with Confederates in close pursuit, which made the Union soldiers defending the line reluctant to fire on the approaching masses. This, combined with the opening in the works through which the Columbia Pike passed, caused a weak spot in the Union line at the Carter House. The Confederate divisions of Maj. Gens. Patrick Cleburne, John C. Brown, and Samuel G. French converged on this spot and a number of their troops broke through the solid Federal defenses. Strickland's regiments fell back to avoid capture. A spontaneous counterattack, led by the brigade of Col. Emerson Opdycke and fortified by rallied elements of Wagner's men, newly mustered regiments such as the 44th Missouri, 175th and 183rd Ohio, and two veteran Kentucky regiments, managed to retake the lost works and seal the gap after brief but vicious hand-to-hand combat. By 5 p.m., when the sun set, the Union line was again firmly entrenched. On the east side of the battlefield Maj. Gens. William W. Loring and Edward C. Walthall saw their troops torn apart. Maj. Gen. William B. Bate on the west side of the field fared no better, and no further assaults were attempted on the flanks.
In the center, however, the Confederates, believing that an irreparable breach had been made and seeking to exploit it, made repeated but uncoordinated assaults on the Union second line. After dark, around 7 p.m., the division of Maj. Gen. Edward "Allegheny" Johnson attacked and had no more luck than its predecessors, but was the only division of Lee's intact corps to be ordered to attack. Large numbers of Confederate troops became pinned down in the ditch fronting the main line, and an intense firefight transpired for hours, each side firing through embrasures or over the top of the parapets at close range in an attempt to dislodge the other.
By 9:00 p.m. the fighting had mostly subsided. The overall attack had been awesome, described by some as a tidal wave, and known as the "Pickett's Charge of the West." But it was actually much larger than the famous charge at Gettysburg. In the East, 12,500 Confederates had crossed a mile (1.6 km) of open ground in a single assault lasting about 50 minutes. In Franklin, some 19,000 marched into the guns a distance of nearly two miles (3.2 km) and conducted assaults in multiple waves that lasted over five hours.
Across the river to the east, Confederate cavalry commander Maj. Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest attempted to turn the Union left flank, but the Union cavalry under Maj. Gen. James H. Wilson repulsed his advance.
Schofield, who spent the battle in Fort Granger (just across the Harpeth River, northeast of Franklin), ordered his infantry to cross the river, starting at 11:00 p.m., despite objections from Cox that withdrawal was no longer necessary. (Union reinforcements under Maj. Gen. A.J. Smith were already in Nashville.) Although there was a period in which the Union army was vulnerable, straddling the river, Hood was too stunned to take advantage of it. The Union army began entering the breastworks at Nashville at noon on December 1. The victor of this battle was the Union army.

I found this work on http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Battle_of_Franklin